Pennsylvania reported its first measles-related deaths in 35 years this week, marking a concerning resurgence of the disease in the United States. The national total of confirmed measles cases has now exceeded 2,900 — the highest number since the disease was officially declared eliminated in the year 2000. While debates continue about the effectiveness of vaccines, the larger issue remains the United States' inability to monitor and respond to dangerous diseases in a unified and timely manner. Currently, there is no centralized system for tracking biological threats in near real-time, as each state independently manages its own list of reportable diseases and uses varying data formats. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), which is responsible for monitoring such threats, lacks the authority to mandate data reporting and instead relies on voluntary submissions from 50 states and over 3,000 local jurisdictions. As a result, national disease counts are provisional and often revised on a weekly basis. Efforts to establish a more unified system have faced significant hurdles. The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC), created in 2007 to improve disease monitoring, achieved only limited success by 2015 due to a lack of resources and authority. By 2023, NBIC still lacked clear performance measures, and the intelligence community’s biosecurity center was ordered to shut down in December 2025. Despite these challenges, the current strategy remains more of a slogan than a concrete plan. In September 2025, the Secretary of Health and Human Services stated that the CDC’s Biothreat Radar Detection System could identify dangerous pathogens like H5N1 or MERS early enough to prevent major outbreaks. However, the system is still considered "proposed," and only a small fraction of the requested funding — about $7 million of a $100 million request — was approved by Congress. Future funding requests have also included cuts to state and local preparedness grants, while the federal government has already terminated $11.4 billion in grants to local health departments that provide critical data. A proposed solution to these challenges is the creation of a National Biosurveillance Task Force, which would be housed within the Department of Health and Human Services and led by a civilian official. This task force would have operational control over the people, systems, and budgets involved in federal biosurveillance. It would be supported by multiple agencies, including the Department of Veterans Affairs, and would be funded through a single, unified appropriation to ensure that resources align with the mission. The task force would have the authority to set national data standards, using existing mechanisms such as Medicare conditions of participation and federal health IT certification to enforce compliance. States that wish to participate could contribute their National Guard civil support teams, which include mobile labs capable of identifying biological agents, using federal funding — similar to how states supported rapid testing during the pandemic. The task force’s initial focus would be on food safety, an area where fifteen different agencies currently administer at least 30 separate laws, yet no national strategy exists. By creating a centralized system that integrates data from all levels of government and private entities, the task force aims to provide a comprehensive, real-time view of biological threats. In return for contributing their data, states, counties, tribes, hospitals, and companies would receive an integrated picture of health threats within hours, along with preferential access to federal funding. The system would be built at federal expense and provided free of charge to participants, with technical support available. Importantly, the task force would only handle de-identified data, ensuring privacy and compliance with health information laws.