New research has examined the intelligence failures leading up to the September 11 attacks, including the CIA’s handling of information about two future hijackers and possible connections to Saudi Arabia. Dr. Patrick Bury, from the University of Bath, has written a study titled "9/11 as a Catastrophic Systems Failure: Reassessing the Unclassified Evidence," which will be published in the journal Intelligence and National Security. The study uses recently declassified documents from the FBI and CIA, as well as court records and official investigations, to explore how intelligence was mishandled before the attacks. Dr. Bury’s research looks at the role of individuals linked to Saudi Arabia who supported the hijackers in the United States and questions whether that environment was connected to CIA efforts to gain access to al-Qaeda. While the new material does not confirm direct coordination between the CIA and Saudi Arabia or official Saudi state sponsorship of the attacks, it provides a fresh context for evaluating long-standing concerns about the CIA’s failure to share information with the FBI. The study highlights that the CIA had knowledge of an important al-Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000 and was aware that future hijacker Nawaf al-Mihdhar held a valid U.S. visa. However, this information was not shared through regular intelligence channels. FBI agents working with the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center tried to inform FBI headquarters, but their efforts were blocked. Later, as the FBI investigated the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, they repeatedly asked the CIA for relevant intelligence, but the full picture remained hidden. Newly released documents show that after arriving in the U.S., al-Mihdhar and his companion, Khalid al-Hazmi, quickly became embedded in a broader network of individuals linked to Saudi Arabia, including Omar al-Bayoumi, a Saudi national who helped them settle in California. Recently declassified FBI records reveal that Bayoumi had closer ties to Saudi government and intelligence structures than previously known. The study suggests that CIA officers initially saw al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi as potential opportunities to gain access to al-Qaeda’s network rather than as immediate threats. While the new evidence supports this perspective, it does not yet confirm that this was the reason for the intelligence being withheld.