Ukrainian drone strike hits Russian data center

Recent days saw a Ukrainian drone strike hit the largest data center in Russia, owned by the banking and technology group Sberbank. This strike occurred after Ukraine targeted three data centers belonging to the technology giant Yandex, often referred to as the "Russian Google."

Yandex traffic drops sharply

Following these attacks, Yandex traffic dropped by 94 percent. Its users experienced significant disruptions affecting email, search engines, GPS navigation, music, ride-hailing services, marketplaces, and financial services.

Zelensky comments on disinformation

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that these strikes had allowed people to "breathe better on many social networks," reducing Russian disinformation and the activity of specialized bots. Subsequent articles cast doubt on Zelensky's claim.

Data centers as military targets

Data centers are unusual military targets. However, this may change as their importance grows. Attacking them can disrupt enemy military operations and the daily civil services that depend on these facilities.

Russia's economic vulnerability

In Russia, these disruptions could slow down the economy and thereby weaken the country's ability to continue the war. The Ukrainian strikes occurred after Russian attacks on Ukrainian data centers and internet service providers.

Precedent set by Iran

They also follow a precedent set by Iran earlier this year, when the country attacked data centers in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain in response to American attacks. These Middle Eastern data centers were operated by Amazon Web Services, the world's leading provider of cloud computing services.

Data center resilience

In general, data centers rely on equipment duplication and backups to prevent the loss of a single facility from having long-term negative consequences. Despite these precautions, the Iranian strikes resulted in prolonged service degradation and the irreversible loss of some data.

Russia's limited backup options

Russian data centers may have fewer opportunities for international duplication. This is due to Moscow's particular vision of "digital sovereignty," which it has actively promoted for about a decade.

Digital sovereignty and control

The idea that nations should have autonomy and control over their own data and digital infrastructure is legitimate. However, Russia's pursuit of "sovereignty" has also allowed it to censor online information and isolate Russian internet users from global internet services.

Sanctions and data storage laws

In 2015, Russia adopted laws requiring certain data to be stored on its territory. These obligations were compounded by international sanctions imposed after Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As a result, Russia's ability to maintain backup infrastructure abroad has significantly decreased.

Understanding disinformation

Disinformation is often defined as the strategic dissemination of deliberate falsehoods. Governments have frequently tried to combat it by removing these false information or refuting it on the platforms where it circulates.

Beyond false information

However, influence operations take many diverse forms. Not all of them spread false information. Most aim to undermine public trust and delegitimize democratic processes and institutions.

Examples of influence operations

For example, during the 2023 referendum in Australia on the creation of a representative body for indigenous peoples within the Parliament, activists produced competing and plausible narratives to exacerbate political polarization. In New Zealand, influence operations took the form of misogynistic abuse campaigns aimed at undermining public support for political initiatives.

Russia's global influence

Russia is known for its orchestrated interventions in democratic life around the world. These interventions often aim to sow discord, mistrust, and confusion. Supporting candidates with pro-Russian positions can also be an objective.

Countering influence

Civil society and activist groups have developed innovative approaches to tackle this problem. They have, for example, sought to refute false information, counter it before it is even disseminated, report misleading content to platforms, or use humor and memes strategically.

Physical infrastructure of disinformation

The attacks on Russian data centers recall that Russian internet services, including influence operations, depend on physical infrastructure. Whether or not these strikes this time resulted in a significant decrease in the activity of disinformation bots, targeting the infrastructure behind this disinformation could be an effective way to curb it.

Russia's infrastructure vulnerabilities

Russia has more than 100 active data centers on its territory. Few have backup systems and continuity plans. Concentrating all digital activities on a relatively small number of physical sites creates a vulnerability.

Rebuilding challenges

When these infrastructures are hit, their reconstruction can be long and difficult, especially since Russia depends on China for its supply of advanced semiconductors.

Lessons for countering disinformation

What lessons can be drawn for the fight against Russian disinformation and, more broadly, against Moscow's influence operations? A first set of responses could involve imposing physical or regulatory restrictions, including sanctions, on platforms and services based in Russia, such as Telegram.

International cooperation needed

Other solutions would require international cooperation to reduce Russia's disruptive capacity in the digital space. This could include supporting Ukraine's efforts on the front in the context of bilateral security agreements.

Digital sovereignty and resilience

Regardless, recent events have shown that Russia's digital influence largely relies on physical infrastructure, rare materials necessary for the production of semiconductors, and a national ecosystem of platforms isolated from the global web. By continuing to isolate itself in the name of sovereignty, the Kremlin also makes itself more vulnerable to attacks and disruptions.

Building resilient digital systems

Democracies can draw lessons from this. Digital sovereignty is not achieved through isolation and vertical control of digital infrastructure. It is built and continuously renegotiated through distributed backup systems across different regions of the world, risk management and governance frameworks, and strategic alliances that ensure the functioning of essential systems and their resilience to attacks.