On 10 June, the Estonian Parliament approved the sixth version of its National Security Doctrine, which formalizes a concept known as "active defense" (aktiivkaitse). This doctrine replaces the February 2023 edition and was initially proposed as early as 2025. The government cites increased tensions between states, Russia's war in Ukraine, and shifts in the United States' military stance as reasons for the update. The document was made public for consultation in April 2026, approved by the government on 7 May, presented to Parliament on 19 May, and finally adopted on 10 June. While it does not outline specific military operations, it sets a clear strategic direction: to prevent threats, defend the country if needed, and win any potential conflict. "Active defense" is defined as using measures against hostile forces to prevent attacks, disrupt them, or reduce their effectiveness. The doctrine views the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—as a single area of operations. According to the government's explanatory note, active defense may include striking deep into enemy territory. The goal is to prevent combat from occurring on Estonian soil. This represents a significant shift in strategy. Estonia not only aims to slow down an adversary that has breached its borders but also wants to strike the enemy's concentrations of forces, logistical networks, and firepower before they can act effectively. The document identifies Russia as the main threat to Estonia and to the broader Euro-Atlantic security framework. It claims that Moscow continues to seek to reshape European security and restore its influence. Other countries, including China, North Korea, Belarus, and Iran, are cited as supporting Russia's actions in Ukraine. Estonia is also preparing for potential threats such as sabotage, cyberattacks, influence campaigns, and migration pressures, which are seen as tools of destabilization. The country's geography adds to these concerns: Narva, a border town with a large Russian-speaking population, is directly facing Russia. For Estonia's capital, Tallinn, losing territory early in a conflict could quickly expose a large portion of the country and its population. The 2026 doctrine is not a complete departure from previous strategies. As early as January 2024, the Baltic states launched a joint defense zone designed to protect their territories "from the first meter." Estonia's defense development plan for 2026–2029 already included plans to neutralize threats before they reached the country. The main novelty is political and financial: the principle of active defense is now part of the state's official reference document. It explicitly allows for long-range strikes. Additionally, the military effort moves from a minimum target of 3% of GDP in the 2023 Concept to at least 5% starting in 2026. Estonia is also enhancing its military presence in key areas. The 1st Infantry Brigade, the main maneuver unit of the army, has moved its staff and command company from Tapa to Jõhvi, a town in the northeast, about 50 km from the Russian border. A company is set to be stationed in Narva starting in 2027, with plans for a barracks and temporary installations. This presence serves both military and political purposes: it demonstrates the state's commitment to the border region and aims to strengthen the sense of security among its residents. However, units closer to the border are more exposed to risks, and their effectiveness depends on early warning systems that allow them to relocate before an attack begins. Estonia plans to build up to 600 group shelters, storage zones for obstacles, and anti-tank ditches in the northeast and southeast regions. These measures will be deployed during an actual threat rather than in peacetime. In 2025, Estonia withdrew from the Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Mines, which banned landmines. The country has received six American HIMARS rocket launchers and ordered three more, as well as South Korean K239 Chunmoo launchers. These systems can reach up to 300 km, but the capability remains incomplete due to delays in receiving longer-range American missiles and the expected arrival of Chunmoo systems in the second half of 2027. Air defense is another critical component of Estonia's strategy. Advanced military units and infrastructure are vulnerable to enemy missiles, drones, and aerial attacks. The 2026–2029 defense plan includes an air defense brigade and the acquisition of systems such as IRIS-T, Piorun, and Mistral. A medium-range system, purchased in collaboration with Latvia, is expected to be delivered in 2026. Estonia is also investing in drones, anti-drone capabilities, and ammunition stocks. Arms contracts aim to support local industries, such as those involving Hanwha, a South Korean defense company. For the first time, the doctrine recognizes the defense industry as a key part of national security. Starting in 2026, military defense must receive at least 5% of GDP, with additional funds allocated for civil defense and resilience. The 2026 budget reaches 2.4 billion euros, or 5.4% of GDP, with more than half going toward acquisitions. For the period 2026–2029, Estonia plans to spend over 10 billion euros on defense. About 37% will go to equipment, 25% to ammunition, and 14% to personnel. This strategy emphasizes firepower, stockpiles, and material readiness over a significant increase in personnel. Despite an expected public deficit of 4% in 2027, the budget maintains the 5% GDP target, which affects other investments, including the Rail Baltica rail project. Estonia continues to rely on a model combining a small professional military force, conscription, and mobilizable reservists. Military service remains the primary method for training reserve units. Starting in 2027, all conscripts will serve twelve months: six months of training followed by six months in a combat-ready unit. This setup aims to maintain a ready force without the need for full mobilization. The goal is to reach 4,400 active military personnel by 2030 and increase officer training. Reservists will be recalled regularly, including at short notice, to test mobilization capacity. The Defense League, a voluntary armed organization responsible for territorial defense, also receives reinforced funding. The doctrine emphasizes a comprehensive defense strategy, where the army, government, businesses, and the population must work together. Every resident is encouraged to be able to meet their basic needs for at least seven days and evacuate if necessary. Society as a whole must be able to function for at least thirty days in the event of a disruption in land, sea, or air links. This requirement is based on the distribution of water, food, medicines, energy, and equipment among households, companies, municipalities, and the state. A new law adopted on 6 June 2026 merged several texts on crises and national defense, clarifying responsibilities and strengthening the role of the Prime Minister in crisis management. However, active defense does not replace NATO. The doctrine is based on three pillars: Estonian forces, allied units in the country, and reinforcements planned for crises. Tallinn demands that NATO defend from the eastern border with credible conventional and nuclear deterrence. However, the order of priorities is evolving: national forces must now be able to inflict losses and hinder the adversary before more significant reinforcements arrive. Estonia believes that European countries must increase their military efforts, develop their defense industries, and take on a greater share of their own security.