Since 2020, Europe has faced a series of interconnected challenges, including a global pandemic, supply chain disruptions, an energy crisis, and the resurgence of war in the region. These crises have exposed vulnerabilities in the continent's political and economic structures, especially as the world has seen the rise of powerful, often authoritarian nations and a shifting balance of influence among the United States, China, and Russia. In response, the European Union has increasingly emphasized the concept of strategic independence, a term now frequently used by leaders such as German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde. This shift is particularly visible in the defense sector, where European countries have boosted military spending by over 45% since 2022, and the European Commission has introduced new funding mechanisms to support national defense programs and the defense industry. However, the implementation of these rearmament efforts is being hampered by what experts call a national bureaucratic-industrial complex. While decisions are made at the European level, they must be translated into national budgets, administrative processes, arms contracts, and industrial choices. This process is often slowed by ingrained national priorities and bureaucratic inertia, despite the urgency of the current geopolitical situation. The success or failure of Europe's rearmament efforts will largely determine the continent's strategic future, and if these administrative challenges are not addressed, European countries may not be fully prepared by 2030 to effectively deter potential threats, particularly from Russia. The war in Ukraine has reshaped European strategic priorities, but the actual implementation of new policies and programs has lagged behind. Three key characteristics from before 2022 continue to shape the rearmament landscape: a continued reliance on the United States for defense equipment, the dominance of national interests over collective European goals, and limited cooperation among European states. Despite the EU's desire to strengthen its strategic role within the Atlantic Alliance, nearly half of the funds spent on defense acquisitions still go to non-European suppliers, with about a third of that coming from the United States. This dependency has been further reinforced by the PURL (Prioritized Ukraine Needs List) initiative, a joint effort between NATO and the U.S. in July 2025, which has increased Europe's reliance on American defense industries. At the same time, rearmament efforts remain largely driven by national interests, which are not well coordinated across the continent. This has led to what some describe as a "rearmament of states against Europe," with national industries competing rather than cooperating, leading to duplicated programs and gaps in interoperability. For example, French company Dassault Aviation and German firm Airbus have had disagreements over the aircraft components of the SCAF (Strategic Air and Space Forces) armament program. Germany also withdrew from the Iris² satellite network project in March 2026, highlighting the lack of unity in defense cooperation. Despite the growing defense industry in Europe, the continent's ability to act collectively remains limited. Less than 20% of defense equipment is acquired through joint European cooperation, even though such collaboration is seen as essential for operational readiness and strategic independence. The European defense market is increasingly behaving like a war market, where national interests push for self-sufficiency, even as supply chains and component production become more transnational. The EU's goal of a "European preference" in defense acquisitions is undermined by the lack of a unified market. The lack of coordination and trust between European states has created what some describe as an archipelago of rearmament: a collection of national actors with shared goals but operating largely independently. The challenge lies in execution: why does national-level decision-making still dominate, even when collective action is in the best interest of the continent? At the budgetary, market, administrative, and human levels, national interests often prevail over European unity. Without addressing these issues, Europe's rearmament efforts will remain fragmented, inefficient, and ultimately less effective in securing the continent's long-term security.