The applicant claimed to have been employed on April 15, 2013, as a secretary by the company Hainaut Peintures. After the company was placed in judicial liquidation on May 28, 2018, the liquidator informed her on August 10, 2018, of the contestation of her status as an employee. She then filed a claim with the labor court on March 21, 2022, to recognize the existence of an employment contract and to obtain payment of various sums related to its execution and termination. On September 27, 2024, the Court of Appeal of Douai ruled that her claims were time-barred and therefore inadmissible. The applicant then filed a cassation appeal, seeking to overturn the decision. The applicant criticized the Court of Appeal of Douai for declaring her entire claims time-barred. She argues that the action seeking to recognize the existence of an employment contract falls under the five-year prescription period provided for by Article 2224 of the Civil Code. She particularly criticizes the trial judges for having refused to apply this prescription on the grounds that the parties had only invoked annual, biennial, and triennial prescriptions. According to her, whenever a claim based on prescription is raised, the judge must determine the legally applicable time limit, even if the parties have made a mistake regarding it. The Court of Cassation annulled and canceled in all its provisions the judgment rendered on September 27, 2024, by the Court of Appeal of Douai. It first recalls, under the provisions of Articles 2247 and 2224 of the Civil Code and Article L1471-1 of the Labor Code, that the judge cannot raise an argument based on prescription on his own initiative. However, when a party invokes prescription, it is the judge's duty, after respecting the principle of contradiction, to determine the legally applicable prescription period. The Court of Cassation then specifies that the action seeking to qualify a contract, the legal nature of which is disputed, as an employment contract constitutes a personal action subject to the five-year prescription period of Article 2224 of the Civil Code. The starting point of this period corresponds to the date on which the contractual relationship ceased, as it is on that date that the holder of the right becomes aware of all the facts necessary to exercise it. The court therefore criticizes the Court of Appeal of Douai for having held that, since the parties had not invoked the five-year prescription, the judge could not apply it. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeal of Douai, with a different composition. The judgment clarifies the distinction between raising a prescription on one's own initiative and determining the applicable prescription period. In principle, Article 2247 of the Civil Code prohibits the judge from raising an argument based on prescription on his own initiative. This means that the judge cannot decide on his own that an action is time-barred if no party invokes it. However, once a party invokes the prescription, the judge cannot limit himself to the period mentioned by that party. He must determine the legally applicable period, subject to respect for the principle of contradiction. The judgment also has an interest regarding the qualification of the action for the recognition of an employment contract. The Court of Cassation considers that this action, when the qualification of the contractual relationship is disputed, falls under Article 2224 of the Civil Code and therefore a five-year prescription period. This solution allows distinguishing the action aimed at obtaining the recognition of the very existence of an employment contract from actions directly related to the execution or termination of an employment contract, for which Article L1471-1 of the Labor Code provides specific time limits. The main contribution of the judgment is therefore in defining the role of the judge: the judge cannot raise the prescription on his own initiative, but he must determine the legally applicable period when a party invokes the prescription. The judgment thus constitutes an important clarification of the role of the judge in matters of prescription and recalls that the legal qualification of the applicable period does not depend on the period invoked by the parties.