The **Council of Governors** raised the three main interest rates by 0.25 percentage points, pushing the deposit rate to 2.50 percent. This is the second rate increase in three months, with financial markets anticipating a third by December. The primary reason given is rising energy costs, which have climbed more than 14 percent over the past year due to the conflict in the Middle East. In France, Roland Lescure at Bercy revised the 2026 growth forecast down to 0.5 percent, half of the initial budget assumption. The **Insee**, France's national statistics office, had earlier predicted 0.4 percent growth in a report titled Orange Alert on Growth, describing the situation as a "specific air gap" in the French economy. Just 12 days later, the **S&P Global PMI** survey showed an index of 53.1 for the entire eurozone, highlighting the contrast between the central bank's tightening and the accelerating economies in other regions. France is lagging behind, with one rate affecting twenty-one countries. Economists refer to this situation as the Walters critique, noting that in a monetary union, the nominal cost of money is the same for all countries, but the real cost—what influences investment—depends on local inflation. This means the burden of higher interest rates is heavier in countries where prices increase the least, which is currently the case for France. Its harmonized inflation peaked at 2.7 percent in August, compared to 4.5 percent in Spain. After adjusting for price increases, the cost of money approaches minus two points across the Pyrenees and nears zero in France. In Madrid, inflation reduces the debt burden, while in Paris, borrowers pay full price. The tightening mainly affects the economy that needs it the least. The shock is common, but the bill is national. The rebound of the French PMI in September to 51.2 does not change this diagnosis. **S&P Global** sees part of the improvement as a catch-up after the heatwaves in August, and Germany, at 53.8, remains far ahead. The double punishment includes both monetary and budgetary asymmetry. The yield on the 10-year **OAT** (French government bond) exceeded 4 percent in August, partly reflecting monetary policy but also a risk specific to France: a persistent deficit and a 2027 budget to be built on reduced growth. The country suffers from two simultaneous tightenings, one from Frankfurt and the other imposed by the markets. Robert Mundell and Peter Kenen identified this risk in the 1960s with the theory of optimal monetary zones. A single currency requires synchronized economic cycles or shock absorbers, such as labor mobility, budget transfers, or wage flexibility, to handle imbalances. Europe has not built these at the right scale. The relative convergence of recent years masked this weakness, and energy crises have exposed it, as they affect each country with different intensity. The French nuclear park protects households, while dependence on hydrocarbons transmits the shock more quickly, up to 4.2 percent inflation in Belgium. The **European Central Bank** can do nothing about it and knows it. Its mandate is to regulate the average, like adjusting the thermostat of a building, not the temperature of each apartment. Irony of the era, France, long accused of exporting its laxity, now imports the rigor of others. The issue is therefore not monetary. How long can a union live with divergent economic cycles without a common budget to bring them closer? In 2011, the institution had already tightened its policy at the wrong time during the sovereign debt crisis. The current episode reopens this issue, with redistributed roles.