Rap songs praising terrorism, foreign flags at the edges of demonstrations, and religious "wallah" chants on social media have been observed alongside the chaotic movement of high school students, raising concerns about a potential "French intifada." The movement of dissent in high schools could be seen by some as a major rehearsal for a civil war, though a civil war is not necessarily what will happen, as conquests can also occur silently when adults refuse to acknowledge that there are still things to defend, according to Charles Rojzman. At Beaugency (45), during a mobilization at the François-Villon high school, young people sang a rap song referencing Mohamed Merah, the Bataclan, and Salah Abdeslam. The scene was filmed on October 1, 2026, and on October 6, the Orléans prosecutor's office announced the opening of a preliminary investigation for incitement to terrorism. Fdesouche shared the video, and Le Parisien reported on the facts and their judicial follow-up. In a school mobilization, names associated with massacres became lyrics that were repeated together. A young person immediately reported these facts to the public prosecutor, hoping that the authors would be prosecuted. In Palaiseau (91), near the Henri-Poincaré high school, a video broadcast on September 30 showed a small group of young people, some with their faces hidden, holding Palestinian and Algerian flags in front of a fire. These emblems introduced national affiliations and geopolitical references into a French school protest whose presence deserved to be questioned. What power relationship did they express? What community did they designate in front of the institution they contested? Near the Henri-Poincaré high school in Palaiseau (91), community symbols appeared with students taking photos in front of a fire in the street, holding Palestinian and Algerian flags. A video presented by Boulevard Voltaire as filmed in Mitry-Mory (77) showed a young man attributed these words: "They are only ten, in the name of Allah, we kill them!" The context and identification of this sequence remained to be confirmed independently. However, the statements reported crossed an entirely different threshold: the religious invocation explicitly accompanied a death threat. French high schools could well be the laboratories of a conflict that goes far beyond school demands. Blocked schools, confrontations with the police, adolescents discovering in the street a power that their daily existence had never given them; then fires, staff attacked, external actors who appear in front of the gates. Anger has its reasons, but those who take it up may have other ambitions. The lack of teachers, deteriorated buildings, and anxiety about the future belong to the reality of school life. Recognizing them should allow us to hear the students and resolve their difficulties. However, when the mobilization becomes the place where those who teach, manage, or provide aid are attacked, the question of its objectives changes in nature. On October 1, 2026, AFP reported attacks against school principals in several cities, violence against the management of the Victor-Hugo high school in Marseille (13), and against firefighters intervening in front of Saint-Exupéry. The school institution was affected even in those who ensure its daily functioning. The next day, according to the statements of the Minister of National Education, 65 staff members, including 40 principals, had been injured since the start of the movement. Édouard Geffray added that most of the injured principals had indicated that they were confronted by people who were not their students. Who then came in front of the gates, with what means and to obtain what? The presence of these external actors obliged us to examine how a school protest could become the ground for a confrontation that adolescents neither mastered the objectives nor the consequences of. High schools are also the places where several French youth meet. Their social and family experiences remain deeply different, while common representations of domination, humiliation, and revenge circulate. Decolonial discourses offer some an explanation for their wounds; a sometimes favored youth finds in it also a way to join the camp of the oppressed. These approaches can provide a common adversary before even a common future has been considered. Clothing codes, language, music, and models spread on social networks contribute to this underground political formation. Beaugency reveals a particularly dark dimension: the most murderous references can be transmitted in the ordinary forms of adolescent culture, carried by imitation, the search for prestige, and the desire to scandalize. Palestine provides, on another register, an emblem capable of uniting French anger. Its presence in front of high schools already has its dates and actors. On May 6, 2024, at the Blaise-Cendrars high school in Sevran (93), Louis Boyard and Rima Hassan came to support the students mobilized for Gaza, while the Union Syndicale Lycéenne called for the blocking of schools for a ceasefire and the recognition of the Palestinian state. The rapprochement between high school mobilization, Palestinian cause, and insoumis leaders was then explicit. Why does Palestine exert such a power of identification? Because it can inscribe personal humiliations, social frustrations, and historical resentments in a global confrontation. For those who adopt this reading, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict becomes an interpretation of their own existence: their anger now belongs to a struggle that exceeds their neighborhood and country, while French institutions can be designated as the local representatives of a universal domination. The school demands constitute the starting point of the movement; they do not exhaust its political meaning or its influences. The lack of teachers can cause a blockade, while other actors give anger its words, its emblems, and its adversaries. The mobilizations for Gaza have already brought together high school students, militant organizations, and insoumis leaders: it is necessary to examine how these links are extended in the current protest and can contribute to transforming school difficulties into a confrontation with French institutions. The comparison with Israel takes its meaning. In May 2017, Khaled Mechaal presented a Hamas program accepting the principle of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, while maintaining the refusal to recognize Israel and the objective of liberating all of Palestine. A territorial compromise can thus be considered without the legitimacy of the adversary being admitted. This difference allows us to understand why the resolution of a grievance does not necessarily end a conflict. The Palestinian suffering is real; its existence does not reveal by itself the objectives of those who claim to represent it. An organization can mobilize the injustices suffered to legitimate an ambition that would outlive them. When the adversary is considered illegitimate in his very existence, every concession risks becoming a step in the pursuit of the fight, rather than an opportunity for appeasement. The comparison with France concerns this mechanism: transforming a condition of victim into a permanent legitimacy, then this legitimacy into a means of changing power relations. It invites us to examine the projects that sometimes hide behind the wounds invoked, the institutions that one wants to delegitimize, and the authority one intends to replace. This question finds support in the official report Frères musulmans et islamisme politique en France, published in May 2025. Its authors examine the mobilizing role of the Palestinian cause in the history of the brotherhood, its legitimization processes, and the long-term implantation. They also describe local networks where religious, educational, associative activities, and relationships with elected officials intersect. This document allows us to study a durable influence strategy; its articulation with high school mobilizations calls for a precise investigation on the actors and their links. A political and cultural conquest can progress through the organization of daily life, the formation of collective references, and the acquisition of an inescapable interlocutor position. The colonial memory, discriminations, and social difficulties then become resources in a struggle to define who represents the victims, who speaks on their behalf, and which rules should be transformed. The existence of an injustice does not suffice to make just the project of the one who denounces it. It never dispenses us from examining the power he seeks, the alliances he builds, and the world he intends to impose. The intifada becomes, in this perspective, a model capable of traveling: a way to maintain the uprising against an adversary whose legitimacy is continuously rejected. Applied to France, the term designates here a hypothesis on the construction of a power relationship, on the learning of confrontation, and on the transformation of anger into a political identity. The France Insoumise occupies an important place in this landscape. Its participation in the mobilizations for Gaza is documented; its role in the organization of the current movement is the subject of a specific government accusation. On October 1, 2026, Matignon, citing intelligence services, stated that it was an "organized maneuver by LFI and its ultra-left proxies." Manuel Bompard immediately contested this accusation. The elements cited were not made public, and their examination would remain necessary; but the question of the political organization of the blockades was nevertheless raised at the top of the state. Supporting a demonstration, exploiting its anger, and organizing violence constitute different responsibilities. But political leaders must also answer for what they encourage, the adversaries they designate, and the forms of confrontation they give prestige to. What do they transmit when they make revolt a proof of virtue and authority a presumption of guilt? Because adolescents learn something from politics in these mobilizations. A conflict can lead them to discover their adversaries, to confront their interests, and to build common rules. It can also teach them that force dispenses from understanding, that the humiliation of the other provides immediate power, and that a political existence requires the possession of an enemy. The high school would then become one of the places where the protagonists of future conflicts are formed, where the promise of revenge takes the place of a future to build. Today's high school students will become tomorrow's adults, but some risk facing unemployment, precarity, and the feeling of having no place. Those who have learned to recognize themselves in confrontation can become available for organizations capable of giving direction to their despair. The revolt of adolescence would then continue into adult anger, nourished by social humiliation and maintained by those who know how to identify culprits. These organizations do not necessarily pursue the same objective. The militants of a social revolution and the supporters of a religious order can share adversaries while preparing incompatible worlds. The Palestinian cause can bring their mobilizations together without resolving this contradiction; this contradiction could even become one of tomorrow's conflicts. It remains to consider what these antagonisms can produce in France. A civil war, if the confrontations end up opposing durable fractions of the population? Or a more silent transformation, progressing as the institutions recede, as adults renounce exercising their authority, and as citizens, exhausted, accept what they would have previously refused in order to regain peace? The second hypothesis deserves particular attention. A society can lose control of its institutions through a succession of renunciations, when its divisions prevent it from defending common rules and those who want to transform them have a more coherent will than those who want to preserve them. Beaugency obliges us to look at what becomes singable, Palaiseau what becomes an emblem of confrontation, the attacks against staff what happens to authority. These facts have different meanings, but they raise together the question of what society transmits and what it still manages to defend. When references to assassins enter the repertoire of adolescents, adults cannot afford to wait for the anger to pass.