In May 1962, France conducted a nuclear test in the Sahara desert known as the Beryl test. The test, which took place on May 1, 1962, in the Taourirt Tan Afella massif in the Algerian Sahara, aimed to test the AN-11, France's first operational nuclear weapon. Engineers had constructed a deep gallery in the rock, assuming the thick granite would contain the explosion and its radioactive fallout. However, the actual power of the explosion was significantly higher than expected—later estimates suggest it released nearly 50 kilotons of energy, compared to the anticipated 20 kilotons. The overperformance of the explosion caused the containment measures to fail, leading to the opening of armored doors and the release of radioactive material. A plume of radioactive particles and debris rose to approximately 2,600 meters before spreading over an area of nearly 150 kilometers to the east. Due to the incomplete sealing of the gallery, between 5 and 10 percent of the total radioactivity from the blast escaped into the environment. Two French ministers, Pierre Messmer, then Minister of Defense, and Gaston Palewski, Minister of Scientific Research, were present during the test and were exposed to radiation doses exceeding 50 millisieverts. This level of exposure, while not immediately lethal, is far above standard safety limits. It is estimated that more than 5,000 residents of the Hoggar region were affected by the radioactive cloud, along with approximately 2,000 military and civilian personnel at the test site and thousands of local workers involved in construction. In the days following the incident, the military conducted urgent decontamination efforts, treating 900 individuals on the first day alone. However, these initial actions were largely ineffective, requiring an additional 775 people to be decontaminated over the next eight days. Several dozen military personnel were quietly evacuated to the Percy military hospital, where they received months of intensive care in strict secrecy. The Beryl test occurred shortly after the Évian agreements were signed in March 1962, marking the end of the Algerian war and the beginning of France's transfer of sovereignty to Algeria. The political climate made it difficult for the French military to acknowledge the nuclear accident publicly, and the French military's complete withdrawal from the region would not occur for several years. The incident remained classified for decades, with precise scientific data from the time never made public, leading to ongoing debates about compensating victims. Testimonies from veterans and the gradual release of documents have helped reconstruct the events of the Beryl test. However, the precise scientific measurements taken by the two physicists on site have never been disclosed. These data, crucial for accurately assessing the extent of contamination, remain classified under the guise of state interests. This lack of transparency continues to fuel legal and political discussions about the French state's responsibility and the compensation owed to victims, including both French military personnel and Algerian civilians who suffered the effects of the radioactive cloud without ever being informed of the danger.