The United States imposed a 25% tariff on Brazilian goods on July 15, 2026, and then added an additional 12.5% eight days later, raising the total to 37.5% for goods affected by both. The U.S. had a $14 billion trade surplus with Brazil in 2025, exporting about $54 billion in goods like refined fuel, aircraft parts, industrial machinery, fertilizer, and electronics. Meanwhile, the U.S. imported around $40 billion in Brazilian goods, including crude oil, semi-finished steel, coffee, orange juice, wood pulp, beef, and passenger jets made by Embraer. This is the second time President Trump has attempted to impose tariffs on Brazil. In July 2025, he announced a 50% tariff on Brazilian goods, but the U.S. Supreme Court struck it down in February 2026, along with most of his other tariffs. The administration exempted 471 Brazilian products, including coffee, wood products, crude oil, natural gas, fertilizer, orange juice, and pig iron. These exempted goods are primarily commodities and industrial inputs that American buyers would struggle to replace quickly. The goods still subject to tariffs are mostly manufactured products like shoes, clothing, furniture, machinery, and ethanol. Brazilian footwear and apparel, which compete on price in American stores, received no exemption. Talks between the two nations have stalled, but in-person meetings are scheduled for September 30 during a Group of 20 trade meeting in Wisconsin, just before Brazilian elections. In 2025, the total value of goods traded between the U.S. and Brazil reached $94 billion, which is significantly less than the volume of trade with countries like Canada, Mexico, China, or the European Union. However, Brazil ranks among the 17 largest trading partners of the United States in terms of goods flow, ahead of countries such as Spain, Australia, and Saudi Arabia. The goods affected by tariffs are primarily industrial inputs, meaning the cost of the tariffs is mainly borne by U.S. companies, which pay when the goods arrive at the border. China has been Brazil’s largest trading partner since 2009 and increased its lead in subsequent years. In 2025, China accounted for about 29% of Brazil’s exports, while the U.S. accounted for only 11%. This reduced reliance on the U.S. market limits the impact of Trump’s tariffs. It also explains why, when the U.S. imposed tariffs on global imports in 2025, Brazilian exporters were able to find alternative markets. Trump did not focus on trade issues when he announced the 50% tariff in July 2025. Instead, he criticized the U.S. government’s criminal prosecution of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, whom Trump views as an ally. The U.S. also accused Brazil’s Supreme Court of restricting American social media platforms within Brazil. Bolsonaro, who once aligned Brazil with the U.S., is currently serving a 27-year sentence for plotting a coup and cannot run for office again. His son, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, is running for president but has urged Trump not to impose tariffs. His brother, Eduardo, a Brazilian congressman, spent months in Washington lobbying for the tariffs, believing they would help his father’s case. Despite these tensions, polls indicate a tight race between Flávio Bolsonaro and former President Lula, with 13 other minor candidates also vying for the presidency. After the first round of tariffs was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Trump administration used a different legal tool—Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974—which allows a president to retaliate against foreign practices deemed unfair. Brazil, initially unable to respond, passed a new "economic reciprocity" law in 2025, allowing it to impose countermeasures if foreign actions harm its competitiveness. Brazil initiated its first case under this law on August 13, 2026, targeting the U.S. However, launching a case does not guarantee retaliation, as the process involves seven administrative stages that can take more than six months. Brazil is also pursuing a multilateral strategy through the World Trade Organization (WTO), a Geneva-based body that writes and enforces global trade rules. After consultations with the U.S. ended in August without agreement, Brazil plans to request a formal WTO dispute panel to determine if the U.S. tariffs violate WTO rules. China has joined Brazil’s complaint, with India, Indonesia, South Africa, Colombia, and Egypt also supporting the case. However, any official retaliation by Brazil against the U.S. is considered unlikely due to the significant power imbalance. The U.S. has a much larger consumer market, and its control over the dollar-based financial system and critical technologies gives it leverage in trade disputes that Brazil cannot easily counter. A trade war could shift to areas where Brazil has no ability to respond in kind. Canada's situation illustrates the potential consequences of such a trade war. After trade talks with the U.S. collapsed, Canada responded with tariffs of up to 50% on hundreds of U.S. goods, deepening the trade conflict. Canada sends about three-quarters of its exports to the U.S., giving its retaliation real economic impact, even if it risks its own economy. Brazil lacks this leverage, but the steps it is taking show the government is taking action, which can be politically significant.