The United States has announced a new partnership that claims control of 55 percent of over 65 billion barrels of crude oil in Venezuela, through field concessions that could last up to 100 years. This move has raised questions about how U.S. policy might be shaped toward other oil-producing nations, particularly Iran. While the deal appears to be a regional matter involving Venezuela, it is being closely watched as a possible blueprint for how the U.S. might approach Iran in the future. The U.S. has been pursuing two distinct strategies against oil-producing adversaries: one involving military action in Venezuela, and the other focusing on economic sanctions in Iran. In Venezuela, the U.S. strategy involved a military operation, the capture of President Nicolás Maduro, and the installation of an interim government that quickly signed away long-term access to oil fields. This allowed the U.S. to gain significant control over Venezuela's oil resources, displacing China, which had been the country's largest oil customer. In contrast, the U.S. has focused on economic pressure in Iran, using Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s “Operation Economic Outcast” to cut off Iran’s economic lifelines, particularly targeting its largest oil buyer, China. Both strategies aim not only to weaken the targeted countries but also to reduce China’s access to discounted oil that is close to U.S. sanctions. However, while the Venezuela model may inform future U.S. approaches to Iran, the two countries are fundamentally different. Unlike Venezuela, Iran does not have a captured leader or an interim government willing to make long-term concessions. Any significant transfer of oil assets would require either a major political settlement or a regime collapse, neither of which is currently likely. Additionally, Iran’s oil sector is less damaged than Venezuela’s, and Tehran has developed alternative partnerships to reduce its dependence on U.S. favor. The legacy of the 1951 oil nationalization under Mohammad Mossadegh makes resource sovereignty a deeply political and symbolic issue in Iran, unlike in Venezuela. Venezuela’s own model may not be stable in the long term, as its constitution assigns primary ownership of oil resources to the state. A long-term concession signed by an unelected government could be challenged by a future elected administration. Despite these differences, the Venezuela deal shows how the U.S. can use political leverage to gain control over resources when the conditions are right. As a result, terms like “reconstruction investment” and “sanctions-relief partnership” may appear in future negotiations with Iran, signaling the possible influence of the Venezuela model on U.S. strategy.