Recent reports suggest that cameras used in Royal Navy drones included components with parts manufactured in China, which transmitted regular "heartbeat" signals to an IP address located in China. These signals, which are automated updates or check-ins, were discovered during routine cyber testing. Following the identification of this issue, internet access to the affected camera systems was cut off, and the vulnerabilities were addressed. There is currently no evidence that sensitive data, imagery, or classified systems managed by the Ministry of Defence were accessed or compromised. The incident underscores the growing concerns about risks embedded in modern technology supply chains. While no data theft has been confirmed, the situation serves as a cautionary example of how even seemingly minor components can pose significant risks when their functions and origins are not fully understood. These components can provide insights into device presence, operational time, and usage patterns—information that, when combined with other data, might reveal valuable intelligence. The event also highlights the limitations of the "buy British" strategy, as contemporary technology is often composed of parts sourced from multiple countries. While defense organizations may have a clear understanding of their primary suppliers, visibility diminishes significantly with secondary and tertiary suppliers, which may include smaller companies and software providers whose components are less scrutinized. Modern warfare, influenced by conflicts such as the one in Ukraine, is increasingly relying on rapidly evolving commercial technologies. This shift creates a tension between the need for strategic autonomy and the benefits of global technological innovation, which can lead to dependencies that governments aim to minimize. The focus should be on the functionality of components rather than their country of origin. Components that can capture data, process information, or communicate independently require closer examination, especially those that are critical to operations, such as cameras, radios, sensors, and communication modules. While ensuring supply chain security is important, it should not be the sole line of defense. The architecture of systems also plays a crucial role. Components that do not need internet access should be restricted from it. Techniques like network segmentation, limiting telemetry data, controlling communication paths, and using air-gapped systems where necessary can reduce the risks of unexpected behavior. A centralized repository of vetted components, complete with detailed Bill of Materials (BOM), can enhance supply chain security, increase transparency, and improve the management of vulnerabilities. Perfect knowledge of every component is neither practical nor economically feasible, as it could slow down the pace of defense innovation. Instead, a risk-based approach focusing on trusted manufacturers and vendors is needed, with particular attention given to components and software that pose the highest risk. This should be complemented by architectural controls and continuous assurance efforts to reduce exposure in other areas.