In legal terms, the lifelong human assistance aid is a form of compensation awarded to victims of bodily harm, designed to support their ability to live independently, maintain social relationships, or work. This compensation is often considered central to the "life project" of the victim, as recognized by courts during damage assessments. The compensation can be provided either as a periodic lifelong annuity or as a lump sum (capital), and the choice between these two forms affects how the compensation is distributed over time, the economic risks involved, and the victim's control over the funds. Under the law, there is no general right for victims to demand compensation in the form of a lump sum for future assistance needs. Courts have the authority to decide whether to provide compensation as an annuity or a capital, guided by the principle of full compensation "without loss or profit" and the victim's best interests. Courts may choose an annuity even if the victim prefers a capital, if they believe it offers better protection or aligns with the recurring nature of the need. On the other hand, a capital might be granted if the victim's life project requires significant investment and their ability to manage funds is not in question. The real challenge arises when the court's decision conflicts with the victim's choice. In such cases, full compensation cannot be evaluated purely in terms of money, as the way the compensation is structured also involves the court's role and the victim's freedom to manage their assets. This issue becomes particularly significant when the court's decision excludes the choice of a legally capable person. The key scenario involves a major, legally capable victim who explicitly requests a lump sum to cover future assistance needs, without any question about their management capacity, yet the court opts for a lifelong annuity. The question then is whether the court's power over the compensation form can override the victim's choice, and if so, under what conditions. Positive law recognizes the court's power to decide between annuity and capital, but it does not clearly define the conditions under which this power can be used against a victim's choice. The court's power should not become a form of oversight over the victim's financial management. Positive law acknowledges the court's authority over the compensation form and outlines its justifications, particularly in terms of full compensation and the victim's protection. However, when this power leads to disregarding the victim's choice, it must be examined in light of the principle of free disposal of compensation and patrimonial autonomy. The Court of Cassation has stated that victims can freely use the compensation awarded to them, and for certain bodily injuries, the compensation cannot be tied to actual expenses or invoice production. This free disposal refers to how the compensation is used, not its form. A lifelong annuity, once paid, is also freely usable by the victim, without a need to justify the use of each installment. However, this free disposal assumes the victim can manage the overall value of the compensation. An annuity, by spreading the value over time, may limit the victim's ability to make long-term financial decisions, while a lump sum allows immediate and full use, though it carries risks of poor management or wastefulness. The concept of "management capacity" is a factual assessment, allowing the court to consider, when vulnerability indicators exist (such as cognitive disorders, protective measures, very young age, or documented financial behavior), the need to prioritize a protective annuity. It cannot be used as a general condition for granting a lump sum. A doctrinal distinction can be made among several categories of victims: the major victim, legally and concretely capable of managing her patrimony; the victim showing demonstrated vulnerability (without being under a protective measure); the victim under a protective legal measure; the minor; and the victim whose cognitive issues actually affect management capacity. For the first category—major, legally capable victims with no concrete management difficulties—the presumption of capacity should lead to recognizing a particular priority for their choice of a lump sum, except in exceptional circumstances. For the other categories, an annuity can be prioritized or even imposed in the name of the victim's protection, provided it is accompanied by an individualized justification. This approach allows the "victim protection" argument to be reintegrated into a more precise legal framework. Courts often justify the annuity by citing the continuity of resources, the adequacy with the periodicity of the need, and the protection against risks of waste and financial uncertainties. These considerations are legitimate, but they cannot, in the absence of concrete vulnerability elements, become a form of oversight over the patrimony of a fully capable person. The question remains whether the court's power over the compensation form can become a power of protection against the victim's own choices, to the point of denying her immediate access to the capital intended to compensate her damage on the abstract grounds that she might misuse it. Positive law does not provide an explicit answer to this question. However, the principles of legal capacity, free disposal of compensation, and patrimonial autonomy suggest a nuanced approach: the court can protect a vulnerable victim by prioritizing an annuity; it should not, however, systematically override the judgment of a fully capable victim on how to manage their compensation. A principle of priority could be proposed: when a major and capable victim explicitly requests a lump sum for lifelong human assistance, and no particular element questions their management capacity, their choice should in principle be respected. The imposition of an annuity against this choice should be reserved for individualized, objectively established circumstances, and accompanied by a particularly rigorous justification.