Ilya Boudraïtskis, a historian at the University of Helsinki, and Ilya Matveev, a political scientist at the University of Berkeley, have published a book titled Russia’s New Imperialism: Capital and Ideology through Stanford University Press in September 2026. The book analyzes Russian imperialism in the post-Soviet era, emphasizing the connection between economic interests and ideological goals, starting with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The authors argue that the international left often misunderstands or overlooks Russian imperialism, sometimes portraying it as a defensive reaction to Western imperialism or failing to recognize it as imperialism altogether due to theoretical limitations. Some left-leaning scholars argue that Russia does not export enough capital to fit the Leninist definition of imperialism. Others see Russia as a victim of American imperialism, suggesting the war in Ukraine is a preventive and defensive move against NATO. However, the authors claim that this viewpoint hinders a proper understanding of current events, as it led some to deny the possibility of an invasion of Ukraine before February 24, 2022. The authors propose a new theory of imperialism, distinguishing between an economic aspect and a political one. They argue that Russian imperialism has shifted from an economically driven dimension to one that is primarily politically and ideologically motivated, with a key turning point in 2014. This shift is marked by aggressive military expansion and the prioritization of politics over economic interests, moving from a "partial ideology" to a "total ideology." The authors suggest that the Russian elite's shift from a cynical ideology centered on pure interests to a total ideology was influenced by events such as the 2011-2014 demonstrations in Bolotnaia Square, the Arab Spring, and the events of Maidan. These events convinced the Russian elite that the West was trying to orchestrate regime change everywhere, including in Russia. The authors also note that the dominant analytical framework of the Putin regime has long been that of kleptocracy, but this perspective fails to explain why the Russian elite would accept the loss of assets in the West. The authors argue that Russia's obsession with Ukraine stems from a nationalist vision in which Ukraine is considered an essential part of Russian power. They suggest that losing Ukraine would mean losing Russia itself, and this belief underpins the radicalism of Vladimir Putin and his refusal to negotiate. Despite this, the authors note that the Russian population has not fully embraced the imperialist and nationalist logic defended by Putin, and there is growing dissatisfaction with the war. The authors observe a decline in Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, as countries like Kazakhstan and those in the South Caucasus are seeking additional security guarantees by building relations with other global powers. They argue that European countries must take the Russian threat seriously and avoid dismissing proposals to strengthen European defense as absurdities imposed by dominant parties. They suggest that Europe needs to become independent of U.S. influence and develop its own security strategy.