It was not the size or weight of the foam that caused the disaster for the space shuttle Columbia, but the speed at which it collided with the orbiter. According to the report by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), the foam struck the shuttle at a relative speed of about 877 km/h, similar to the speed of a commercial airplane in flight. The piece of insulation weighed only 0.757 kg—less than a liter of milk—but it was enough to cause the fatal damage. The foam hit the left wing of the shuttle, piercing a reinforced carbon composite panel, which ultimately led to the loss of the shuttle and seven astronauts during re-entry on February 1, 2003. The impact occurred during the shuttle's ascent on January 16, 2003, when a piece of insulation broke off from the external fuel tank and struck the shuttle's left wing. The foam had been traveling with the shuttle at about 2,523 km/h before it detached. It slowed down rapidly due to its low density and lack of propulsion, reaching nearly 1,645 km/h before impact. Meanwhile, the shuttle maintained its speed, creating a relative impact speed of about 877 km/h. This difference in speed, rather than the foam's own speed or weight, determined the energy of the collision, which was comparable to a 1-ton car traveling at 24 km/h. To verify the damage caused by the foam, the CAIB conducted a test at the Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio using an air cannon. A foam projectile weighing 1.67 pounds was fired at a replica of the shuttle's wing panel, successfully reproducing the breach seen on Columbia. The test confirmed that the foam could indeed cause significant damage to the shuttle's structure. This finding challenged the belief at NASA that foam impacts were merely a maintenance issue and highlighted the need for improved safety measures. The CAIB's report also pointed out that the shuttle program's management practices contributed significantly to the disaster. The reinforced carbon composite panels on the shuttle's wing were not designed to withstand impacts, and only visual inspections were conducted after delivery. The damage caused by the foam allowed superheated air to enter the shuttle during re-entry, leading to the structural failure of the wing and the eventual disintegration of the orbiter. The investigation concluded that the accident was the result of a combination of factors, including the foam strike and the lack of adequate safety protocols. The report, released in August 2003, recommended a comprehensive program to eliminate any foam loss from future shuttle missions.