The so-called "president fraud," or "fraud by fake director," is a sophisticated form of social engineering that targets companies. Fraudsters use techniques like email and phone impersonation, sometimes with number spoofing, to mimic a company director or agent. They then trick an authorized employee into issuing urgent wire transfer orders, often to accounts outside the SEPA zone. These operations are legally authorized from the bank's perspective because the order comes from someone with the proper powers under the account agreement. As a result, the special liability regime outlined in the Monetary and Financial Code for unauthorized or improperly executed operations does not apply. Instead, the victim must rely on common law contractual liability under Article 1231-1 of the Civil Code to seek compensation from the bank. This requires the victim to prove the bank failed in its duty of vigilance. Recent decisions by the Commercial Chamber of the Court of Cassation, including those from 2 October 2024, 12 June 2025, and 19 November 2025, have provided important guidance on how this duty of vigilance should be applied. These rulings emphasize that banks must verify the regularity of payment orders when apparent anomalies are detected. However, the verification must be done with the person contractually authorized to issue such orders, not necessarily the company director. This approach balances the principle of non-interference—where banks are not supposed to interfere in their clients’ affairs—with the need to detect and prevent fraud. The phenomenon of president fraud is not new, but it has grown more sophisticated with the rise of digital communication and online banking. The sums involved can be substantial, often reaching millions of euros in a short period. Affected companies face two major challenges: the difficulty of recovering funds from beneficiaries often located outside the European Union, and the legal obstacle of the operation being deemed "authorized" under payment services law. In such cases, the bank’s contractual liability becomes the only possible recourse, but the conditions for this liability are strict and must be carefully met. The Court of Cassation’s decisions highlight the importance of contractual authorization in determining who must be contacted for verification. They also clarify that the presence of apparent anomalies—such as unusual transaction amounts, recent repetition of operations, or atypical geographical destinations—must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. These decisions reinforce the need for banks to document their internal procedures for detecting anomalies and for companies to maintain detailed records of their payment activities. This ensures that in the event of litigation, both parties can demonstrate their compliance with their respective obligations. The balance struck by the Court of Cassation is crucial. It avoids placing an excessive burden on banks to act as perpetual overseers of their clients’ transactions, while also ensuring that they are not entirely absolved of responsibility when fraud is detectable. This approach respects the principle of non-interference while protecting against fraud. As fraud techniques continue to evolve, particularly with the advent of more advanced technologies like AI-generated deepfakes, the legal framework will need to adapt to maintain this balance. In the meantime, the 2024 and 2025 decisions provide a practical and clear guide for both banks and companies to navigate the complexities of president fraud.