A protective status for real estate investment funds, but with variable geometry depending on the immobilized vehicle. The Code monétaire et financier does not open up the entire range of real estate funds to non-professional investors. Real estate collective investment organizations (OPCI) and real estate investment funds (FPI) are accessible to them, subject to an AMF approval and enhanced governance — notably a supervisory board of shareholders, tasked with an information and control mission, whose absence of an annual report can already constitute a breach that can be invoked. Conversely, general-purpose professional funds, professional real estate collective investment organizations and professional private equity funds remain, in principle, reserved for professional clients as defined by Article L533-16. Two foundations of liability, cumulative rather than exclusive of each other. A. Delictual liability of the management company: failure to inform on the strategy and risks. The judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal of June 11, 2026, rendered on remand after the annulment of a previous judgment of April 17, 2023 itself annulled by the Court of Cassation on January 15, 2025, offers to date the most detailed illustration of what exactly constitutes a breach of the management company's duty to inform. It concerns investors who subscribed, in 2008, shares in the SCPI Pierre patrimoine 2, managed by SGAM AI (whose rights are now held by Amundi Immobilier), within the framework of the tax reduction "Malraux law" device, before the SCPI was placed in liquidation in 2017 with a realization value of 1,642.05 euros per share. The court makes a decisive distinction between the generic risk of any real estate investment — properly mentioned in the documents provided to the investors — and the risk specific to the strategy actually implemented by the manager, which was not: "this strategy, which made the profitability of the investments depend on factors affected by significant uncertainties, involved a risk level much higher than that affecting any real estate investment." Notably, the court rejects the argument based on the obtaining of the AMF visa on the information note, recalling that "this visa is not intended to attest to the exhaustiveness or sincerity of the elements relating to the investment strategy envisaged by the management company." The fault is thus characterized not in the absence of any mention of the risk, but in the discrepancy between the softened presentation of the strategy and its actual reality, which was indeed much more speculative: "by not mentioning, in the documents it prepared for the investors, the investment strategy it intended to implement [...] SGAM AI [...] committed a fault liable to engage its delictual liability towards Mr. and Mrs. [Z]." The basis retained is delictual — and not contractual — because the relationship between the management company and the holder of SCPI shares does not fall within an individual advisory contract: the management company is subject to legal and regulatory information obligations which apply to it vis-à-vis all subscribers. B. Contractual liability of the CGP/CIF: failure to fulfill the duty of advice and warning. The same judgment sanctions, on a distinct basis, the intermediate wealth management advisor, the company Primonial, not for having recommended an investment unsuitable for the clients' profile — the court rejects this grievance, the investors having declared a "balanced" profile compatible with the investment proposed — but for having provided a numerical simulation that "only considers an increase in the value of real estate assets, even a moderate one [...] and does not mention any risk that could affect this profitability." The court recalls on this occasion the content of the duty of advice, based on Articles 1147 and 1149 of the Civil Code: it must be delivered "with relevance, prudence and loyalty," which implies ensuring not only the suitability of the operation for the client's situation, but also informing the latter "of the least favorable aspects and the risks associated with it." A classic defense argument rejected in passing: neither the professional experience of the investors nor a previous tax reduction investment exempted the advisor from their duty to inform — "the mere subscription of such an investment does not allow it to be assumed that the subscriber is necessarily aware of the risks it presents." C. An assumed cumulation, without hierarchy or exclusivity between the two actions. Methodological point important for building a case: the investors simultaneously sued the management company on a delictual basis and the CGP on a contractual basis for breaches relating to the same facts — the absence of adequate information on the strategy and risks. The court sees no incompatibility with this cumulation. It first confirms the admissibility of the action against the management company by recalling that "the right to act is not subordinate to the prior demonstration of the merits of the action," then separately characterizes the delictual fault of one and the contractual breach of the other, before ordering the resumption of debates to determine the damage and discuss the reciprocal guarantee relationships between the two defendants. It thus emerges, for practice, a clear teaching: when the structure involves both a management company and a distributor intermediary, nothing prevents the investor from choosing between the two — the two bases can be mobilized concurrently for the same damage, each sanctioning a distinct breach related to the nature of the legal relationship with the investor (general regulatory obligations for the management company, individual advisory duty for the intermediary). An unexplored avenue in this case, to be kept in reserve: the nullity for dol by omission. The judgment of October 10, 2022 had, in another context, retained this qualification for a particularly opaque structure proposed to an unalerted foundation. In the 2026 case, however, dol was not alleged, and the court sticks to the sole qualification of fault by failure to inform, without deeming it useful to characterize an intention to conceal. It is necessary to be transparent on this point: no published decision to date specifies, specifically for non-listed real estate funds, the criteria that would allow choosing between the action for nullity and the action for liability when the two could in theory present themselves concurrently, nor whether one should be preferred over the other according to the severity of the behavior of the manager or the intermediary. This articulation remains, as it is, an area of uncertainty that only future jurisprudence can clarify. III. Prescription: a consolidated solution for funds with a fixed term, still unexplored for funds with variable capital. A. The principle set by the judgment of June 11, 2026. The most significant contribution of this judgment lies in the clarification it provides on the starting point of the statute of limitations — a question that had indeed justified the complete annulment of the previous judgment by the same court, of April 17, 2023, which had declared the action prescribed. The court sets the principle in terms that deserve to be quoted in full: "the failure of a wealth management advisor to inform the buyer of SCPI shares of the risk of losses associated with this investment [...], as well as the fault consisting of the SCPI management company not mentioning this risk in the documentation intended for investors, deprives the buyer of a chance to avoid the realization of these losses, so that the period for taking action to compensate for such damage cannot begin to run before the date on which the losses are realized." A practical contribution: the distinction between latent loss and realized loss. The company Amundi Immobilier argued that the investors necessarily became aware of their damage as early as 2010, a valuation communicated during a general meeting having already revealed a 35.31% loss on the value of the shares. The court firmly rejects this argument: "this valuation of the SCPI shares only revealed a latent loss, without the corresponding loss being realized in the investors' estate." (In the case judged, this reasoning led to the adoption, as an alternative second criterion, the expiration of the six-year tax holding period imposed by the Malraux device — expired at the earliest on July 8, 2014 — so that the action, filed on April 8, 2019, was not prescribed.) B. An extension to funds with variable capital that remains, as it is, an untested hypothesis. It would be tempting to directly transpose this reasoning to OPCI and other FIA with variable capital, whose net asset value deteriorates gradually rather than through an isolated liquidation event. The logic of the judgment — a latent loss not being a realized loss — seems to naturally apply there. However, it is necessary to be precise on what the available jurisprudence actually allows to affirm: no decision to date has ruled on a fund with variable capital whose loss materializes through a succession of decreases in net asset value, without liquidation or contractual term crystallizing the damage clearly. The question of when precisely such a gradual and sustained decrease should be considered as "realizing" the loss — first significant decrease? Stabilization at a low level? Absence of recovery prospects? — remains open, and it is precisely on this ground that the essential debate on the admissibility of their actions will be fought by practitioners facing OPCI or FPI in difficulty. IV. A decision still incomplete: the question of the evaluation of the damage referred to autumn 2026. It is necessary to note, for the rigor of the analysis, that the judgment of June 11, 2026 does not finally resolve the dispute. The court, after having found the liability of the two defendants, ordered the resumption of debates at the hearing of October 6, 2026, inviting the investors to justify the tax reductions they had benefited from — an element necessary for the calculation of the net capital loss — and inviting all parties to comment on the possibility of a negotiated solution. Conclusion. The judgment of June 11, 2026 offers today the most detailed illustration of two principles now well established: an assessment method of the information fault based on the discrepancy between the announced strategy and the strategy actually implemented, and a protective reading of the statute of limitations that clearly distinguishes latent loss and realized loss. It also confirms, for contentious practice, that the delictual liability of the management company and the contractual liability of the distributor intermediary accumulate without exclusivity. Two shadows remain, however, which must be closely followed: the articulation with a possible nullity action for dol by omission, and especially the application of this protective prescription principle to funds with variable capital — a field on which, to date, no jurisdiction has yet ruled.