The sectarian dimension of the Yemeni conflict is often linked to regional rivalries between the Sunni Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran. While this is a key aspect of the ongoing conflict between the Houthi movement and its opponents, its influence has varied throughout the war. As violence escalates, sectarian tensions appear to be resurfacing. The Houthi movement is closely tied to the revival of Zaydism, a branch of Shia Islam that originated in what is now Iraq during the early centuries of Islam and spread to the Arabian Peninsula in the ninth century. Zaydism was a dominant religious and political force for over a millennium before being largely replaced by republican rule in 1962. Zaydism, to which about 40% of Yemenis are formally affiliated, has lost much of its political and religious significance since then. While the current ruling elites are largely of Zaydite origin, they tend to promote a more generic Muslim identity rather than emphasizing Zaydism. A new generation, however, is pushing for a renewed Zaydite identity, inspired in part by the success of Iran's Islamic Republic. This group feels marginalized economically and politically, and is reacting against the rise of Salafism in the region. Hussein Al-Houthi, a member of parliament and a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, plays a central role in promoting Zaydite religious and educational activities that challenge the existing international order. The emergence of the Houthi movement coincided with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which heightened sectarian tensions across the Middle East. This context gave the group a more pronounced sectarian identity, often aligning it with pro-Iranian Shia influence. In response to the Houthi armed offensive in Saada in 2004, the Yemeni government emphasized their alleged ties to Iran and its allies. The death of Hussein Al-Houthi in September 2004 did not end the conflict, as his father and later his half-brother, Abdelmalik, took over leadership. During the Arab Spring in 2011-2012, sectarian issues were largely set aside, with accusations of Iranian collusion fading. The Houthis, despite their historical Zaydite roots, integrated into the political transition and participated in the national dialogue. However, in late 2013, former President Ali Abdallah Saleh secretly allied with the Houthis, undermining the transition and enabling their takeover of Sanaa. This period saw open sectarian rhetoric linking the Houthis to Iran and "Shiite heresy." In 2014, the Houthi takeover occurred at the expense of the Muslim Brotherhood, who had supported the political transition. This left Sunni Islamists feeling humiliated and more inclined to adopt a sectarian stance. When Saudi Arabia launched the "Decisive Storm" operation in 2015, it emphasized international law and the restoration of the legitimate government, while also using sectarian rhetoric against the Houthis. Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood, despite their differences, were at the forefront of the fight against the Houthis, achieving the liberation of Aden. While the war initially had a strong sectarian dimension, the religious aspect did not intensify as expected. The Houthis presented themselves as representing a broad range of religious sensitivities, co-opting Salafists and others. Their policies often created tensions among religious actors, but their rejection of sectarian discourse and the population's attachment to a more generic form of Islam tempered the religious dimension of the conflict. The Houthis' focus on the defense of the Palestinians placed them within a broader pan-Arab context. In 2024 and 2025, their attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea linked to Israel and the US, along with Israeli bombings, allowed them to move beyond religious categories. On the Saudi side, the kingdom gradually withdrew from the Yemeni conflict since 2018, culminating in a ceasefire in 2022 that lasted until the summer of 2026. Religious figures who could fuel a sectarian narrative against the Houthis were marginalized or erased in Saudi public life. However, since the summer of 2026, with the escalation of the war involving Iran, there has been a strong return of religious rhetoric around the conflict. Salafists continue to play a significant role in the war effort, with their leaders integrated into military institutions. While their criticism of Zaydism is not explicit, it remains a latent undercurrent. The Houthis have framed their recent offensive toward the Bab El-Mandeb Strait in terms of resistance to the Saudi blockade, distancing it from the war in Iran or any sectarian defense of Shia Islam. The Saudi kingdom, increasingly cornered by the Houthis and the blockade on its ports, is more cautious about providing religious legitimacy to its policies. The announcement of a drone attack near Mecca on September 15, 2026, reignited sectarian rhetoric. The Houthis denied responsibility and organized a large demonstration in Sanaa in defense of Mecca against the Al-Saoud family. The new Saudi mufti, Saleh Al-Fawzan, appointed in late 2025, issued a text directly condemning the Houthis, linking them to the devil and framing the fight against them as a religious duty. His appointment, approved by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, was unexpected given the trend of sidelining religious figures since 2015. Al-Fawzan's online archives, including thousands of fatwas, were deleted in April 2026 to erase traces of his past positions. The text of Saleh Al-Fawzan on the Houthis illustrates a shift in Saudi policy, confirmed by recent statements from members of the royal family on social media. This change has been indirectly criticized by Oman's mufti, Ahmed Al-Khalili, who has long supported the Houthi stance on the Palestinian issue and advocated for Muslim unity. He implicitly criticized Al-Fawzan, emphasizing the need to focus on protecting Palestine rather than dividing Muslims. To reduce sectarian tensions, other Saudi media figures are attempting to promote dialogue and understanding. On the Saudi channel Al-Khalijiyya, journalist Abdallah Al-Mudayfir interviewed Mohammed Azzan, a former Houthi associate, in a program titled Is every Zaydite a Houthi? The expected answer is largely negative, suggesting that not all Zaydites are aligned with the Houthi movement. Religious figures in the Arabian Peninsula are no longer as influential in shaping political narratives, with security and economic concerns taking precedence. However, sectarian rhetoric in speeches is rarely a precursor to reconciliation. Once triggered, the polarization of religious identities is difficult to stop.