For twenty years, the United States has expressed concern over European countries relying on American security guarantees without contributing enough to their own defense spending. In response, European nations have increased their military investments, but the U.S. now argues that they are trying to build their own defense capabilities independently. At a Defense and Space summit in Brussels on September 30, organized by Euronews, the American ambassador to the EU, Andrew Puzder, criticized European defense priorities, claiming they are influenced by specific interests. He argued that adversaries of the West benefit when Europe focuses more on geography than on the effectiveness of its weapons. At the same summit, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that the current alliance model is not sustainable, as no single country can defend 600 million Europeans alone. Rutte emphasized that the issue is with NATO's structure, not the U.S.'s commitment to the alliance. The U.S. position is that Europe should take more responsibility for its security while purchasing military equipment from the U.S. This approach suggests that Europe should mature its defense budgets and reduce reliance on foreign manufacturing. This stance has shifted from the previous "America First" policy to one where the U.S. acts as a supplier. According to SIPRI, arms imports by European countries increased by 210% between 2016-2020 and 2021-2025. The continent now accounts for a third of global arms imports, with the United States providing 58% of the purchases by European NATO members. U.S. exports to Europe have more than tripled. A study by IRIS, cited by RUSI, estimated that 78% of European acquisitions made after the invasion of Ukraine went to suppliers outside the European Union. Brussels is trying to counter this trend. The SAFE mechanism, which includes 150 billion euros in loans, requires that at least 65% of the value of the equipment financed comes from the EU, EFTA member countries of the EEA, or Ukraine. The European Commission is also preparing to revise European rules on defense public markets. The Pentagon has warned that an explicit "Buy European" clause could lead to reconsidering exemptions from "Buy American" laws that currently benefit European industries. Puzder's argument has some validity. The F-35 fighter jet has no immediate European equivalent, and while European air defense systems exist, they are produced in limited quantities. A tank currently under development does not protect any Baltic border. In the short term, buying existing systems is more practical. However, an army dependent on parts, software, and the goodwill of a distant capital is only autonomous on paper. The war in Ukraine has shown that mass production of shells is as important as technological sophistication. However, an industrial base cannot be created overnight; it requires orders and guaranteed markets. Manufacturers are unlikely to invest in production lines without assured demand. The United States does not oppose European autonomy but objects to it if it costs American exporters. The autonomy the U.S. demands is budgetary, not industrial. This position aligns with a doctrine that uses arms sales as a foreign policy tool. A lingering question remains: Can an alliance endure if its most powerful member demands others to pay more while withholding sovereignty? Europeans are increasingly realizing that they are being asked to grow economically but not to achieve true independence.