Satellite communication restrictions in Ukraine

Restrictions imposed on satellite communications used by Ukraine have raised concerns about the dependency of enterprises on foreign software and infrastructure. According to Ukrainian officials cited by the Wall Street Journal, missions were disrupted or canceled, including for medium-range strike drones and interceptors, due to limitations affecting the speed of movement of satellite terminals, around 160 km/h.

Service restoration reported

The service was reported to have been restored on October 15 by sources from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. This incident has raised questions about who decides the conditions under which essential capacities can be used.

Enterprise dependency on foreign systems

The issue concerns enterprises as well: their messaging, CRM, or cloud infrastructures may depend on political authorizations that no commercial commitment can guarantee. A drone is available, its operator is also available, but when the connection necessary for its mission disappears, part of its capacity becomes unusable.

U.S. government involvement

According to Reuters, citing American and Western officials, the restriction order came from the White House. Starshield, a service provided by Elon Musk, falls under a particular military and contractual framework, and its control conditions cannot be directly transposed to those of a management software.

Broader implications of provider control

This incident recalls a more general principle: the desire to serve a client does not guarantee that a provider will retain the right to do so. A sanction can prohibit certain services, an export control can subject a usage to authorization, a public contract can reserve to the authority that funds it the definition of the employment conditions.

Civil restrictions with precedents

Civil restrictions already have precedents. The U.S. Treasury announced restrictions targeting the supply of certain information technology and software services to individuals located in Russia, effective September 12, 2025. The measure concerned, among other things, the support and cloud services associated with enterprise management, design, and manufacturing software.

GitHub and U.S. sanctions

GitHub provides another example. The platform restricted certain access for Iranian developers in 2019 to comply with U.S. sanctions. In January 2021, it announced that it had obtained a license from the U.S. government allowing it to restore all its services in the country. Commercial intent and public authorization were two distinct conditions.

Precedents not extending to Europe

These precedents concern specific sanction contexts. They do not prejudge a comparable measure against European companies. However, they establish that access to a civilian digital service can be subordinated to a government decision. The mechanism exists; its extension to other situations is a matter of risk analysis.

Business continuity challenges

For an enterprise, the question translates into very concrete operations. If its CRM becomes inaccessible, how can it retrieve exchanges with a prospect, track a quote, or organize follow-ups? If its messaging is suspended, how can it continue conversations with its clients and suppliers?

SaaS dependence and data challenges

With the software provided as a service, the enterprise depends on the continuous operation of systems managed by its provider. It may possess its data and still encounter great difficulties in using them elsewhere. Exporting the customer file does not reconstruct the histories, automations, permissions, and connections to other software.

Distinction in U.S. measures

An important distinction: the U.S. measures cited here explicitly preserved access to the Internet and online communication services. They do not allow the suspension of messaging to be presented as an established precedent. Consult the scope and exceptions of the measure.

Partial restrictions and their impact

A partial restriction also deserves examination: removal of a function, interruption of support, or limitation of certain usages. In the Ukrainian case, the maintenance of many connections did not prevent the degradation of some missions. For an enterprise, the criticality is also measured by the function affected.

Data location and service dependencies

A server in Europe does not resolve the entire question. Data location remains an element of the evaluation. It must be completed by the examination of the contracting entity, the laws to which it is subject, and the technical organization that allows the service to be exploited.

Three key questions for dependency

Three questions must be asked separately: who can access the data, who can maintain or restrict the service, and how to change providers? They concern respectively confidentiality, availability, and reversibility.

Controlled offerings and their guarantees

An offering used under a distinct control can present different guarantees than a simple local distribution. These situations must be examined concretely. The presence of a data center or a subsidiary in a country is not sufficient, on its own, to describe all dependencies.

Digital sovereignty and economic considerations

The French debates on the digital sovereignty of the state find here an operational translation: protecting information and maintaining the ability to work are two complementary requirements. The price of a contingency solution must be included in the calculation.

Evaluating digital dependencies

Six questions to evaluate digital dependency. Which functions would be blocked on the first day? Identify the services necessary for selling, producing, billing, and communicating. Which authorities can affect their supply? Examine the contracting entities and applicable obligations with legal teams.

Testing contingency solutions

Are dependencies concentrated? Identify the cloud, authentication, and common components across multiple applications. Are data reusable elsewhere? Verify the formats, attachments, histories, and access rights. What is the time needed to restore essential functions? Evaluate the human and technical means required for recovery.

Testing and preparation

Has the contingency solution been tested? Verify a restoration or migration on a limited scope. Europe has providers and projects capable of addressing part of these needs. Alternatives to dominant collaborative suites and infrastructure solutions must, however, be evaluated on their functionality, security, deployment capability, and their own dependencies.

Sustainable replacement solutions

Public and private purchases contribute to funding these capabilities. A sustainable replacement solution requires customers, trained integrators, and available skills. Thus, the preparation of continuity joins the construction of an industrial offer.

Proactive dependency management

The Ukrainian incident provides an additional reason to examine these dependencies before a crisis occurs. A manager renewing their CRM does not need to imagine an imminent diplomatic rupture. They must be able to identify external decisions that could affect their access and know how to continue their activities if they occur.