In 2002, the spare capacity of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was 14.5% of global crude oil production. Spare capacity refers to the amount of oil a country can quickly bring back to the market within 30 to 90 days and continue producing. However, by the first seven months of 2026, this figure had dropped to just 1%, a drastic decline that has significantly impacted global oil markets. This decrease came at a particularly difficult time for OPEC+, which had recently relaxed production quotas to gain market share, adding nearly 2.9 million barrels per day to the global supply at the start of the war in Iran. OPEC's spare capacity had already been on a downward trend. In 2003, following the Venezuelan oil strike and the invasion of Iraq, it fell to 2.3%, a level it has never managed to sustain. By 2025, it had slightly recovered to 4.3%, but by the first seven months of 2026, it was back to near 1%. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical oil shipping route, further exacerbated the situation, causing Gulf exports to nearly halt and remaining at critically low levels for nearly three months. Even after an agreement was reached on June 17, exports had not returned to half of their pre-crisis levels. A new indicator, exportable spare capacity, has emerged to better understand the current situation. This measures the amount of oil that can actually reach the market. In 2026, Saudi Arabia's exportable spare capacity will not exceed 0.4 million barrels per day, while Iraq's is only 0.2 million. Kuwait has zero exportable spare capacity, as its 0.4 million barrels of reserves are blocked due to a lack of land infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has the primary alternative route in the region: the East-West pipeline, which connects the Abqaiq complex to the Yanbu terminal on the Red Sea. Before the war, this pipeline transported less than one million barrels per day, but its capacity has been raised to 7 million. However, the Yanbu docks can only handle about 4 to 4.5 million barrels per day. In June, loading was limited to 4.1 million tons, with Yanbu accounting for 92% of the kingdom's maritime exports. Crude oil still needs to be transported through the Bab el-Mandeb strait to reach Asia, but Houthi threats forced some cargo to return through the Suez Canal, which large tankers cannot fully use. On September 11, drone attacks damaged the pipeline, forcing its closure. Riyadh restarted the pipeline on September 22 at reduced capacity, with a full return expected to take six to eight weeks. In Iraq, Baghdad and Damascus signed an agreement in July, with the support of Washington, to rehabilitate the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline toward the Mediterranean, a project that could take up to three years. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has a pipeline connecting Habshan to Fujairah, which transported about 1.5 million barrels per day before the war, with a maximum capacity of 1.8 million. Fujairah offers a key advantage as it directly accesses the Gulf of Oman, avoiding bottlenecks. The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company plans to significantly increase its capacity, with the UAE aiming for a production of 5 million barrels per day. To assess which producers can rebuild their exportable capacities, an adaptability index has been developed, covering 22 OPEC and OPEC+ countries. This index considers five factors: financial resources, governance, infrastructure, geography, and exposure to bottlenecks. The United Arab Emirates ranks highest in this index. Kuwait, despite having a sovereign fund exceeding $1 trillion, has limited flexibility because all its exports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Russia presents another case, as sanctions and damage to its infrastructure from Ukrainian strikes reduce its adaptability. The nominal reserve, or the amount of oil a country claims it can produce, no longer accurately reflects the market power of OPEC+. In the current geopolitical landscape, the share of oil that can actually reach buyers is more important than ever. This shift challenges the traditional logic of production quotas, as producers may be more inclined to compete on their export infrastructure rather than accept predetermined production limits.