On 12 May 1944, American bombers launched their first attacks on German synthetic fuel plants. Albert Speer, who was the Minister of Armaments in Nazi Germany, later claimed that this marked a turning point in the technical aspects of the war. Today, 82 years later, Ukraine has drawn a similar strategic lesson—but with tools that would have been unimaginable in 1944. Instead of traditional bombers, Ukraine now uses long-range drones, manufactured in large quantities and capable of flying over 1,500 kilometers. On 25 September, one of these drones struck the Lukoil refinery in Perm, one of the ten largest in Russia. Since January, Russian oil refining sites have been attacked more than seventy times. Ukrainian military officials claim that these strikes have taken out more than 45 percent of Russia's refining capacity, while more conservative estimates put the figure around 40 percent. The impact of these attacks is profound when considering the cost difference between the weapons used and the infrastructure being targeted. A drone can cost anywhere from tens of thousands to a few hundred thousand dollars. In contrast, a distillation unit in a refinery is worth hundreds of millions of dollars, often relying on Western technology. Under current sanctions, obtaining replacement parts is difficult and often requires smuggling. Repairs can take months, while the drones continue to strike before repairs are completed. This has led to results that traditional sanctions alone could not achieve. Although Europe stopped buying Russian diesel in 2023, Russia found alternative buyers. However, the drone attacks have disrupted this strategy, leading Moscow to impose a diesel export ban starting in July. Initially planned for a few weeks, the ban now lasts until the end of October. The effects of the ban are visible both domestically and internationally. According to the firm Vortexa, Russia's maritime diesel exports have dropped by 81 percent compared to the seasonal average. The country is now importing gasoline at record levels. On the domestic market, the shortage is no longer theoretical. By mid-September, nearly half of the gas stations in Russia were running low on regular gasoline, according to the tracking service Gdebenzin. Diesel prices at the pump have increased by more than 18 percent since January, and several regions have reintroduced fuel rationing. On 1 October, Vladimir Putin acknowledged that these attacks have cost Russia 1 percent of its GDP. The global impact of the conflict is also evident. Before the export ban, Russia supplied about 10 percent of the diesel traded by sea, making it the second-largest exporter after the United States. Its main customers, Turkey and Brazil, are now seeking alternative suppliers, competing with Europe for American, Indian, or Middle Eastern oil. This shift has affected global markets, with diesel prices in the United States reaching a record of $6.51 per gallon in September. This situation presents a paradox for Ukraine: its most effective weapon is also increasing fuel prices for American drivers, which in turn raises the cost of groceries and other goods. In response, Donald Trump publicly asked Ukraine to stop its strikes, while some lawmakers in Congress are considering restrictions on American fuel exports. Ukraine continues its strategy, seeing the fuel shortage as both a political and military tool. By creating a crisis in Russia’s energy sector, Ukraine hopes to gain leverage in negotiations before winter. However, this approach raises a new question that the strategists of 1944 did not face: in a globalized economy, can a country strike its adversary’s wallet without also affecting its own allies?