European counterintelligence faces new challenges as Russia's actions escalate, prompting a reevaluation of offensive strategies and clandestine operations.
Historical tensions with Russia
The growing tensions between Russia and Europe did not begin with the invasion of Ukraine. However, they have taken on a new, more worrying dimension since Russian intelligence services have undertaken destabilizing actions in Europe, directly or indirectly, some of which are violent.Traditional counterintelligence methods
In response to Russian as well as Iranian or Algerian activities, counterintelligence services initially adopted their traditional defensive posture, combining preventive measures aimed at the most sensitive professions and businesses, identification of foreign agents, occasional expulsions, and attempts to turn some of them.Revival of offensive intelligence actions
During the 2000s, the fight against jihadist networks contributed significantly to reviving the spirit of offensive actions in the branches of intelligence services tasked with preventing attacks and degrading the capabilities of terrorist organizations. However, the practice of counterintelligence, by its nature more discreet, because more sensitive, was not fundamentally changed.Orthodox response to Russian aggression
The Russian aggressiveness against European states is now well documented, and the response from authorities has so far been highly orthodox. Identified for a long time, members of the Russian intelligence services present in Europe have been duly expelled, this approach relating both to an operational logic (degrading the adversary's capabilities) and a form of "signaling" (demonstrating the ability to detect hostile actions).Caution in counterintelligence
Orthodox, this reaction has followed the logic of counterintelligence, which holds that, more than in the matter of counter-terrorism, the consequences of actions undertaken must be precisely anticipated and evaluated, which leads many observers to regularly refer to the game of chess. A great deal of caution is systematically applied, and it often leads to a refined form of inaction.Differences in counterterrorism and counterintelligence
The increased mobilization of security and intelligence services in counter-terrorism has accentuated, since the end of the 1990s, the differences in practices and even culture between counterintelligence professionals, known for their patience and attachment to strict compartmentalization rules, and those in counter-terrorism, often pressed, subjected to extreme political pressure, and inclined to break away from classical methods.Shift in intelligence strategy
The return to offensive actions has not been the least of the changes implemented by European services since September 11, but the operations carried out against jihadist networks were conducted on war theaters (Sahel, Afghanistan, Syria/Iraq) or in countries where it was possible, and sometimes allowed, to carry out clandestine violent actions. It was then targeting in the military sense of the term, in a logic of neutralization/decapitation, and in areas where such actions were politically acceptable, if not even valorized.Preparation for new challenges
The rising tensions with Russia and the publicly assumed prospect of a direct conflict with it should now, in the light of the lessons from the global campaign against jihadist networks, which is gradually fading, and from those of Ukrainian operations on Russian rear areas, encourage French services to prepare to conduct genuine offensive actions against a state adversary.Reviving intelligence practices
Reclaiming the full range of intelligence and clandestine action practices The intensification of the European, and especially French, response to Russian activities is a tangible reality. Recent interceptions of ships from the "ghost fleet" have confirmed that the targeting and special operations capabilities of French forces were well mobilized and effective—at least in non-contested zones.Challenges in contested environments
However, one must prepare to act in what pilots call a contested environment and which, in terms of intelligence, takes the form of an authoritarian state at war and respecting none of the international conventions. Fighting for its survival, Ukraine, whose armed forces continue to innovate, has been giving lessons in targeting and mastery of clandestine action in depth for months, if not years.Comparisons with Western intelligence capabilities
The regular elimination of military officials or scientists in the very streets of Moscow constitutes a technical demonstration that only the American and Israeli services are likely capable of in the West. Whatever one may think of the strategic orientations of these two states, it must be acknowledged that they have rare operational capabilities that lead one to question those of the French services.
